Legal Regulation of the Military Activities in the Outer Space

Legal Regulation of the Military Activities in the Outer Space

All you need to know regarding military space activities and the need for regulation
1.

CHAPTER – I

SYNOPSIS

Introduction:

The Outer Space is a borderless domain which is potentially rich in commercial, scientific, and military activities.[1] Right from the commencement of the Space Era, the political leaders of the world and all the international lawyers have tried to establish a legal framework to govern the several activities (as mentioned above) of the countries in outer space.[2]

This is apparent from the fact that the inherent danger of using outer space for military purposes was visualized even before the launching of the first satellite. This is clearly envisaged from the standpoint of President Eisenhower, who (on 10th January 1957), in his State of the Union message, declared his desire to, “enter into any reliable agreement that would . . .mutually control the outer space missile and satellite development.”[3]

Professor Bin Cheng[4] has underlined the following four areas of concern existing in people’s minds at the beginning of the space age. In the words of Bin Cheng, those concerns were as

follows: (i) The arms race and the military use of outer space; (ii) Possible scramble for colonies or resources; (iii) Worries over responsibility and control, as well as over potential harm or damage; and (iv) International cooperation and mutual assistance.[5]

‘Military Activities’ in Outer Space:

In the period of 1960’s, Outer Space was mainly perceived as the domain of a power struggle between the two Superpowers i.e. USA and the USSR.[6] The likelihood of space warfare demands the need of making of a new perspective on the law of war. The law of war contains prescriptive norms derived from a wide variety of sources.[7]

With regard to the space warfare, the corpus juris spatialis[8], in addition to a variety of arms control treaties, contributes additional restrictions to the existing law of war.[9] Having concluded that the traditional law of war will apply to space warfare, and employing the most widely accepted understandings of the terms "peaceful" and "space weapon”, an analysis of relevant legal regulation states that the following military activities are prohibited[10]:

a) Interference with space-based "national technical means" (space based sensors) for arms control verification as between the U.S. and Russian Federation; b) Placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth and on celestial bodies or in orbit around them; c) Testing or other detonation of nuclear weapons in outer space; d) Placement of military bases and conduct of military tests or maneuvers on celestial bodies and in orbits around them; e) Destruction of targets that are not military objects or militarily necessary, and are specifically prohibited such as hospitals, churches, and non-combatants; f) Use of space weapons or tactics that are "inhumane," "disproportionate" to the militarily necessary objective sought, or are incapable of use so as to "distinguish" between legitimate and illegitimate targets (as the terms are used under the traditional jus in bello); g) Development, testing, and deployment of space-based or other anti-ballistic missile systems and components (with a single limited exception); h) Military or hostile use of environmental modification techniques in outer space.[11]

However, the following ‘military activities’ in outer space are not prohibited[12]: a) The use of military personnel; b) the use of space-based remote sensors in support of combat or other military purposes; c) the use of space-based communication, navigation, and meteorological systems for combat or other military purposes; d) the deployment and non-aggressive use of conventional space weapons; and e) the transiting of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in non-orbital trajectories etc.[13]

Legal Regulation:

The first major UN action directed toward establishing a body of law for outer space came in the form of a resolution adopted on December 13, 1958.[14] This resolution was essential in two aspects:

Firstly, it established the direction of subsequent international agreements by stressing international cooperation and the peaceful use of outer space; and

Secondly, it created the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which later became COPUOS.[15]

There were many ways to regulate the measures regarding arms control in relation to outer space from an international legal perspective.[16] One of them was to review the provisions of international agreements pertaining to outer space.[17] According to Gorove Stephen and Ors.[18], such a review might include:

a) The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, b) The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, c) The 1971 Accidents Measures Agreement, d) The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, e) The 1974 Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, f) The Registration Convention, and g) The Moon Agreement, which was not in force yet.[19]

The Outer Space Treaty is the "main base for the legal order of the space environment”.[20] All subsequent international agreements concerning outer space are to a great extent simply amplifications and clarifications of the principles set forth in the Outer Space Treaty.[21]

The purpose of this project is to examine and identify the issues underlying the legal framework which currently apply to ‘military activities’ in outer space. This present research project is divided into five chapters.

Statement of Problems

There is a significant problem regarding the regulating of ‘activities’ in the outer space. It is so due to the issue of “dual use”.[22] It is applicable to the technologies that can be used interchangeably for space launch vehicles and for ballistic missiles intended as delivery vehicles for weapons.[23]

This conception regarding the ‘dual use’ of satellite is giving rise to further difficult legal issues. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty give regard to the military use of space for scientific research and grants a complete freedom to act in the case of civilian scientific applications.[24] Article IV of the OST provides for two separate legal regimes for military activity in outer space: (a) activity conducted on the moon and other celestial bodies; and (b) activity conducted in outer space itself.[25]

Article IV divides the extraterrestrial universe into three parts: the Earth’s orbit, celestial bodies, and outer space.[26] This, according to Jackson and Steven, means that the Outer Space Treaty does not completely free all of outer space from military use.[27]

The U.S. position under the Moon Agreement provides that under Article III of such Agreement, it permits military activities that are not aggressive, i.e. those undertaken for peaceful purposes. However, ‘peaceful purposes’ in this Article does not add any clarification to the contradictory interpretations given to the term “peaceful purposes” in the Outer Space Treaty.[28]

The OST has also got significant limitations which are provided as follows: Article IV bans nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and prohibits only the stationing or placement of these weapons in orbit around the Earth. Though the clause (2) of Article IV provides for complete demilitarization regarding the Moon and other celestial bodies, it does not do so with respect to outer space itself.[29]

Also, proponents of the militarization of outer space criticized the omission of the words "outer space" from the clause (2) of Article IV on the ground that it seems to give legitimacy to the view that outer space is not reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes and could be extensively used for military purposes.[30]

The materiality of the fact is that civilian applications of space capabilities, such as weather, navigation, communications, and remote sensing, are equally significant for military purposes.[31] This concerns especially to communication and observation satellites, as well as systems such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), which is used for the guidance of many precision weapons but also for various civilian consumer applications.[32]

Also, there is no clear distinction between the military missiles and civilian space launch vehicles which is as such because of the technologies that are used to build sophisticated weaponry are often similar or identical to the technologies required for civilian space programs.[33]

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the U.N. considered proposals for prohibiting the use of space for military purposes and the placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space which later on in the period between 1960s and 1970s a number of agreements were adopted to prevent the weaponization of outer space.[34] Although these treaties ban the placement of weapons of mass destruction in the space, they fail to restrict states from placing other types of weapons in space, which has created a loophole that couldn’t prevent the development of space weapons.[35]

As of today many space weapon programs were abandoned due to their lack of flexibility and high production costs, some programs still remain under development.[36] Also, the rapid growth of developing countries military strengths and the global war on terror led to the major power’s continuation of possible space weapon developments.[37]

The successful Chinese anti-satellite missile test in 2007 and Operation Burnt Frost, a US military operation to intercept and destroy a non-functioning U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite named USA-193 in the year 2008 raised the concern of using anti-satellite weapons and the potential of using space-based weapons to counter it.[38]

On 12 February 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) in its Plenary Session.[39] The two countries proposed to conclude a new international legal instrument through negotiation to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, and to preserve a peaceful and tranquil outer space.[40] Though many countries made efforts to prevent the militarization of space development, the development of space weapon has never disappeared with the Cold War, making the prevention of a space arms race hard to achieve.[41]

According to the researcher, due to the development and increase of Space weaponry in outer space, it poses not only difficult legal issues but also represents a clear and imminent threat to international peace and security. Also, clear definitions need to be developed for concepts such as “space weapons,” “peaceful purposes” and “military uses.”

Besides, the fundamental issue of where the space begins should be definitively stated and resolved as the OST fails to distinguish between the Air Space and Outer Space.

Research Questions

The researcher in dealing with the aforementioned problem is going to deal with the following research questions which will suffice the object and purpose of the research. They are mentioned here-in-below:-

q How the term “peaceful purposes” is interpreted under the Outer Space Treaty? Is there any ambiguity in this regard? If so, then, how such ambiguity can be resolved?

q Does the legal regime for outer space prohibits ‘Space weaponization’?

q Does the ASAT and Star War Program are in compliance with the obligations under the Space Law.

Hypothesis

In this research, the researcher shall proceed upon with the hypothesis that the legal regime regarding the regulation of ‘Military Activities’ in outer space have become obsolete and inapplicable, in the light of the growing number of scientific discoveries and rapid technical development in the space weaponry and other space objects over the last few decades. It is so because of the fact that the existing treaties are having several loopholes and many of the developing countries who have not signed the treaties regulating the military activities in the outer space are free to act according to their own wishes.

Objectives of the Study

The general objective of the research work is to study the Legal Regulation Regarding the Military Activities in the Outer Space. The particular objective of the researcher is, firstly, to extensively study the meaning and interpretation of the term “peaceful purposes” under the OST and other treaties. Secondly, to find out whether the legal regulation permitting ‘militarization’ in outer space for ‘Peaceful Uses’ also includes ‘Space weaponization’ and lastly, to justify the ASAT and BMD in the current legal regulation which regulates the Outer Space regime.

Scope of the Study

The researcher has focused purely on only those legal regulations which regulates the military activities in Outer Space. In this research the researcher has focused on the issues of interpretation of the term “Peaceful Uses”, Space Weaponization.

The primary evidence used in this research includes the text of the OST. The secondary evidence used in this research includes various works of authors and research scholars on this topic which have ultimately proved very helpful in providing useful and effective material for this instant project.

Research Methodology

The methodology followed in this research will be purely doctrinal in nature. Therefore, the researcher will be dealing mainly with the doctrinal material available and will do an extensive study on the abovementioned aspects. The research done by the researcher in this Project will be of comparative, descriptive and analytical nature.

The analytical study of several treaties w.r.t. the Legal Regulation of the Military Activities in Outer Space will be based on various available literature, legal text, and other internet resources. In order to find and assess the legislation, definitions, concepts, and other phenomena concerning outer space the researcher will refer to diverse literature from different authors and also will try to compare different concepts wherever applicable.

The researcher will be taking the help of primary sources such as text of OST and other treaties etc. The secondary sources that the researcher will use are the various commentaries, journals, articles and papers relating to this particular case. The researcher will be making extensive use of both of such primary and secondary sources in this research.

Chapterization

The Chapterization of this research project is as follows:

CHAPTER - I

SYNOPSIS

Chapter One will be the ‘Synopsis’ in which the researcher will try to provide a brief overview regarding the activities which are categorized as the ‘military activities’ in the outer space and the problem with regard to the current legal regime which regulates such activities. It also contains the issues raised by the researcher and the methodology that is being followed while dealing with the current project topic.

CHAPTER - II

INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM “PEACEFUL PURPOSES” UNDER THE OST

Chapter Two will focus on the legal issue that would arise in the event of interpretation of the term “peaceful uses” in the OST and the researcher will try to justify the accepted meaning of the term which nullifies any ambiguity in this regard.

Also, the researcher will analyse and compare the term w.r.t. other treaties and will try to ascertain its true meaning.

CHAPTER - III

SPACE WEAPONIZATION

Chapter Three of the project will focus on the future military uses of space and whether the legal regulation regarding the outer space includes ‘Space Weaponization’. In order to find out the applicable approach under the International Regime, the researcher will try to analyse different treaties which deal with this issue in this regard.

CHAPTER - IV

JUSTIFICATION OF ASAT AND STAR WAR PROGRAMME WITH REGARD TO OBLIGATIONS STIPULATED UNDER THE SPACE LAW

Chapter 4 will deal with the justification of the ASAT and Star War Programme w.r.t. legal obligations prescribed under the legal regime. Here the researcher will try and include the relevant issues for e.g. issues pertaining to protection of national interest etc. and will try to address them effectively.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

The Researcher will deal with the conclusion in the concluding Chapter i.e. Chapter VI. Finally, Chapter 5 will be the concluding chapter wherein certain changes will be suggested regarding the legal regime governing the military activities in the outer space which have till date has not been considered yet.

CHAPTER - II

INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM “PEACEFUL PURPOSES” UNDER THE OST

Originally, the world community including the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. urged that space should be used for ‘peaceful purposes’.[42] The problem that arises in regulating the activities in space is linked to the issue of ‘dual use’.[43] This applies with regard to the technologies that can be used interchangeably for space launch vehicles and for ballistic missiles intended as delivery vehicles for weapons.[44]

Also, the civilian or military purposes of satellites can be difficult to differentiate, it is relevant especially with regard to communication and observation satellites, as well as systems such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), which is used for the guidance of many precision weapons but also for various civilian consumer applications.[45]

So far as definitional issues in the Space Law are concerned, there is one issue which give rise to significant concern, if it remains unchecked, can produce serious consequences in many fields of international law.[46] It is the issue of definition of the team ‘peaceful’, particularly as used in Art. IV (2) of the OST, 1967 and Art. 3 (a) of the 1979 Moon Treaty.[47] The following specific issues arise in this regard:

A. Does the "'Peaceful Purposes" Clause Permit Non-aggressive Activity or Only Non-Military Activity to be Conducted on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies?

If we carefully analyze the words provided under the Art. IV of the OST; the express terms of the peaceful purposes clause cover only the moon and other celestial bodies.[48] Also, paragraph 1 of Article IV prohibits lunar or celestial deployment of nuclear and other similar kinds of weapons.

I ] Meaning of the term “peaceful purposes” as “Non - aggressive”:

One group[49] of jurists contends that the term “peaceful purposes” is precisely defined as non - aggressive. Their argument was based upon the most fundamental basis, which provided that in the light of the admonition of the Art. III of the OST, to apply the principles of the UN Charter and International law to outer space, the moon, and other celestial bodies, the drafters could not have intended to prohibit nonaggressive military uses because both sources permit non-aggressive military activity.[50] Also, advocates of the non - aggressive definition hold that, generally, when the Treaty intends to stipulate certain activities, it clearly does so. For example, when an express prohibition is intended, the Treaty clearly does so, such as its prohibition against "the testing of any types of weapons" in outer space in Article IV.[51]

II] Meaning of the term “peaceful purposes” as “Non - Military”:

Another group[52] of jurists who hold that the term “peaceful purposes” means "non - military". According to them, the Treaty must be read as a unit; no one article or clause should be removed and examined in vacuum, but should be viewed in light of the preceding and subsequent articles and this approach is consistent with article 31 of the Vienna Convention.[53] The advocates of the “non – military” interpretation claim to deal with the issue with the joint construction of Art. I and III of the OST as they hold that Art. I, paragraph 1 should not be overlooked when attempting to define peaceful purposes.[54] It is due to the reason that the Art. I, paragraph 1 provides the evidence that all military actions, even the non – aggressive ones, ought to be automatically excluded from the field of lawful activities in outer space, since all the military activities (including the "non -aggressive" ones), in the present scenario, the interest of one state, or a group of states only - and never of all the States as provided by the legal text of the 1967 Treaty.[55]

Though debate still exists between the USSR and the US as to whether peaceful purposes means “non – military” or “non – aggressive”, both now agree that the activity undertaken for a military objective is permissible so long as it is “non – aggressive” in character.[56]

CHAPTER – III

SPACE WEAPONIZATION

In the very first decade of the space exploration, the magnitude of the military activities of the outer space became evident in the light of extension of arms race between the U.S. and U.S.S.R in the outer space.[57]

While the military capability of the Space Technology were being increasingly advancing, the international community was focusing on the legal and institutional framework to develop some normative restraints in order to prevent the extension of national rivalries into this new field.[58] It is because of the fact that in the earlier decades, the two superpowers and now China have conducted anti-satellite missile tests without engaging liability proves that the legal regime which governs the space activities is extremely inadequate.[59]

In the present scenario, the space is not weaponized.[60] We use space for communication; for surveillance and targeting over the battlefields; for weather prediction; for precise mapping and positioning of our own and opposition military assets; for early warning of missile and air attacks; and for general military, economic, and technological intelligence worldwide. Thus space is “militarized” though not yet “weaponized.”[61]

However, it is pertinent to note that there is a clear difference between the “militarization” and “weaponization” of space.[62] The military use of satellites is considered to be “non-aggressive” and “non-offensive”, in that, while satellites may be used to assist conventional or air-based weapons, they themselves have no destructive capability.[63] In contrast, weaponization is generally defined as the development and deployment of weapon platforms specifically designed to project and fight a war in or from space.[64]

Currently one of the most important issues under consideration is PAROS which is prevailing because of the lack of general consensus upon the nations around the globe as to which of these outer space elements should be included in the category of “space weapons”.[65]

The issue are being divided into two major categories:

I] Militarization of Outer Space: The militaries across the world rely on satellites that have been put into the space since the earliest communication satellites were set free to orbit it.[66] The GPS all over the world are used for so called “peaceful purposes” while their peacefulness remains profoundly doubtful as there are satellites which could be used for controlling bombing raids and other malicious purposes.[67]

II] Weaponization of Outer Space: Transporting potentially destructive satellite devices into the space orbit is generally referred to as Weaponization of Outer Space.[68] The weapons which use space as a medium to travel before hitting their targets such as hypersonic technology vehicles are also considered a part of weaponization of outer space.[69]

The missiles which carry dual characteristics, meaning that they could destroy space assets, as well as other ballistic missiles could also be deemed part of the problem.[70]

Although the current international legal instruments concerning outer space do, to some extent, prohibit and restrict the deployment of weapons, use of force as well as military activities in certain parts of space, the related provisions contained in them are seen by some states to be limited in scope and therefore inadequate for preventing weaponization of outer space. The progress of science and technology could make it necessary to strengthen the existing international legal system.[71]

The brief timeline as to the existing legal framework[72] formulated with respect to the issue regarding space weaponization[73] is given here-in-under:

a) Moon Agreement, 1979: This Agreement is a relatively comprehensive legal instrument on restricting military activities on the Moon and its orbit.[74] So far only 11 States had ratified this Agreement, and an additional 5 had signed the Agreement by August 2004.[75] It also has certain drawbacks: Firstly, Art. 3(2) and Art. 3(4) prohibit only tests and use of weapons of any kind on the Moon, and the use of such weapons from the Moon against the Earth, spacecraft and the personnel. However, activities of such kind in the Moon orbit and in outer space other than the Moon are not covered.[76] Secondly, Article 3(3) bans only the deployment of weapons of mass destruction on the Moon and in its orbit, but does not deal with weapons of other kinds.[77]

b) Outer Space Treaty, 1967: This treaty provides for the following restraints: Firstly, it bans deployment of nuclear weapons & WMD in space; creation of military bases, installations and fortifications on celestial bodies; testing of N/WMD weapons on celestial bodies. (Art. IV). Secondly, it directs the states to conduct international consultations before proceeding with activities that would cause potentially “harmful interference” (emphasis added) with activities of other parties. (Art. IX). It also has certain Loopholes which are as follows: Firstly, it remains silent on the use of military satellites for reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, and communications.[78]

Secondly, it fails to address issues pertaining to deployment of non-nuclear, non-WMD, conventional & other weapons including non-nuclear ASAT’s and other satellites performing passive military functions like ISR, communication, navigation etc.[79] Thirdly, it permits the creation of military bases like space stations in orbit and testing of conventional weapons in space.[80] Fourthly, it effectively contains peace time jamming, spoofing, disruption etc. However, it failed to define ‘harmful interference’.[81]

c) Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963): The Treaty establishes three significant implications for space warfare which restricts the military activities in the outer space:

They are as under[82]: Firstly, while the treaty prohibits all nuclear detonations in space, even those that may have value for peaceful military or scientific purposes, it does not regulate detonations of a non-nuclear nature such as those pertaining to conventional, biological, chemical, or high energy laser weapons.[83](Article I). Secondly, because the treaty outlaws "any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" (emphasis added), it may prohibit the use of nuclear fission as a means of space propulsion.[84] To the extent nuclear power sources operate by means other than "explosion," the Treaty does not prohibit their use.[85] Thirdly, the Treaty also prohibits the use of nuclear explosions for non-testing purposes as well.[86]

However this treaty has certain drawbacks: First of all, this treaty Contains no verification provision. The LTBT did not establish an international mechanism to determine whether or not the commitments are being complied with.[87] In practice, the prohibition on testing in the prohibited environments is self-enforceable. Any signatory nuclear-weapon nation that decided to resume testing in these environments would probably use the escape clause rather than embark on secret tests.[88] Concealment would be extremely difficult, expensive and highly uncertain.[89] Moreover, these powers can continue the development of nuclear weapons by underground nuclear explosions.

The potential gains from atmospheric nuclear explosions are very limited. If any other state party to the treaty decided to test, it would probably prefer to do so openly, rather than clandestinely, to demonstrate its nuclear capability to a potential enemy.

But the absence of an international control agency to evaluate events according to specified criteria makes it difficult to substantiate an allegation that radioactive substances from an underground nuclear explosion have crossed the national borders of the testing country.[90]

The debate over space weaponization is typically cast in simplistic, uni - dimensional terms, while many participants caricature their opponents as naive pacifists or rabid warmongers.[91]

d) The ABM Treaty, 1972 : The main objective of the treaty is to eliminate defensive anti-ballistic missile systems from the weaponry of the two superpowers. Also, both the parties agreed not to “develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.”[92] Article I of the ABM treaty prohibits "any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion...in...outer space."[93] This prohibition on testing of weapons applies regardless of whether the nuclear component is characterized as a "weapon."[94] There are two significant loopholes in the ABM Treaty: Firstly, it does not forbid the development of either the tactical ABM (ATBM) weapons capable of intercepting short and intermediate range ballestic missiles or of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.[95] Secondly, there is absence of clear difference between permitted research and prohibited development and testing must be defined for purposes of Art. 5 of the ABM Treaty.[96] Thirdly, the problem is that the term "strategic ballistic missiles" is not defined in the ABM Treaty, which creates complications as to what constitutes a "strategic ballistic missile" as opposed to a "theater ballistic missile". [97]

However, on 13th June, the US unilaterally withdraws from the ABM Treaty thereby marking the end of the ABM Treaty.[98]

CHAPTER – IV

JUSTIFICATION OF ASAT AND STAR WAR PROGRAMME WITH REGARD TO OBLIGATIONS STIPULATED UNDER THE SPACE LAW

Today, ASAT weapons and BMD are the main weapons of concern that are currently under development and testing of these weapons will further reduce the chances of avoiding the weaponization of space.[99] It is difficult to control or limit the effects of weapons in space because, for instance, when sea battles happen, the debris sinks to the bottom of the ocean, but when space warfare occurs, debris can remain for years or for thousand years, depending on the orbit where the combat takes place.[100] On Jan. 31, 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin, in his address to the UN Security Council, while reaffirming Russia's "allegiance" to the ABM Treaty, calling it "an important factor in maintaining strategic stability in the world", he also advocated for elimination of the existing anti-satellite (ASAT) programs and suggested a ban on weapons especially designed to destroy satellites.[101] In an article published by the Princeton university, they contended that ASAT weapons would be prohibited by the ABM Treaty if they were capable of countering strategic ballistic missiles.[102] They argued that if an ASAT weapon became capable of intercepting missiles, then only it would fall within the terms of the ABM treaty.[103] However, the ABM Treaty neither controls highly capable ASAT systems lacking ABM capability, nor does it clearly indicate how such capability is to be understood.[104] Art. 3 of the OST also does not explicitly prohibit the deployment of non-WMD weapons in Earth orbit, terrestrially-launched ASATs, or the development, testing, production or storage of space weapons on Earth.[105] However, Art. IV and IX of the OST have a direct effect over the development, deployment and use of ASAT Weapons. Art. IV provides for the prohibition against placing in orbit round the earth any object carrying nuclear weapons or any kinds of WMD.[106] A reasonable interpretation would of the expression ‘any type of weapons’ would also include ASAT weapons.[107] Also, Art. IX which directs the nations to take “appropriate international consultations” before moving forward with any activity that might cause “potentially harmful interference with the activities of other states in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space”.[108] Although the OST does not provide for the exact procedure for the consultation process, still it is argued that the states developing the ASATs should do only after ‘appropriate international consultations’.[109] On 23rd March 1983, the Reagan administration while announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or the STAR WARS Programme) as an umbrella to defend the U.S. against nuclear attack;[110]the critics of the new program questioned legality of SDI under both existing arms control treaties and general principles of space law.[111] The vast majority of debate concerning the legality of SDI focuses on article IV of the OST.[112] Whether SDI violates the provisions of the OST depends, in part, upon the interpretation given to certain terms used in article IV of the Treaty.[113] For instance, the X-ray laser, which is an essential part of SDI, is intended to be used as a precision beam weapon, but ultimately results in nuclear detonation and destruction[114]As of now, it clearly qualifies as a nuclear weapon.[115] However, unless the nuclear weapon or weapon of mass destruction is either placed in orbit or stationed in space, it is not prescribed by the OST.[116]

The relevant under the OST for purposes of assessing the legality of SDI is found in paragraph one of article IV.[117] Not only does this paragraph directly address the issue of the militarization of outer space but also, it is the only section to impose restrictions on the types of weapons which may be utilized in outer space.[118]

Thus, in order to be legally valid in the constructs of international space law, SDI must pass a two step test: Firstly, does SDI involve the use of either nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction? Secondly, even if nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction are utilized, are they either stationed in outer space or placed in orbit?[119]

The proponents of the SDI argue that full orbit is necessary in order for a weapon to be prohibited by the OST.[120] They rely upon the fact that ICBMs and other offensive missiles are not prohibited since they do not travel full orbits prior to impact.[121] However, nowhere does the Treaty state that full orbit is required.[122] Opponents to the SDI differentiates the X-ray laser from ICBMs by contending that the latter travel through space without pause while the former pauses in space.[123] Depending on the length of pause, the nuclear powered X-ray laser might be regarded as stationed in space and, therefore, prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty.[124] Also, the SDI poses a direct threat to the ABM Treaty.[125] One of the major threat to the treaty results from efforts in weapon technologies which while apparently designed for other purposes, have also capability regarding missile defence applications; they are: ASATs, ATBMs and LPARs..[126]

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

The existing legal framework has undoubtedly prevented the deployment of weapons and use of force or military activities in the outer space.[127] However, as seen by some states, the scope is still limited and there yet need to be more efforts to avoid arms race in the outer space. With the new technologies in this regard, the legal framework can be strengthened to make these treaties more effective.[128] Although there are few clear international legal barriers to ASAT development, the desire of the US to remain in some way responsive to international opinion creates certain inhibitions to the unrestrained pursuit of weapons that are based or operate in space.[129]

A much more complicated issue is to consider a multilateral ban on all testing and use of debris-producing ASAT weapons.[130] If such an agreement could be negotiated and respected the single biggest threat to a sustainable space environment could beresolved.[131] Another benefit would be making illegal the simple but most immediate threat to satellites—ASAT weapons.[132]

There have been a number of initiatives put forward in the last decade to attempt to address the growing problem posed by space weaponization; For instance, the Russian – Chinese joint proposal for a PPWT in 2008 and the EU’s proposed Code of Conduct of 2010.[133] The PPWT failed in the face of opposition from the US, whose main objection was the document’s failure to address the issue of ground-based ASATs, a capability owned by both Russia and China.[134]

2.

Annexure-I

<div class="paragraphs"><p>Bruce M. Deblois</p></div>

Bruce M. Deblois

The Advent of Space Weapons

It has been depicted hereinabove[135]:

3.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

· The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, The ABM Treaty 1972, The Moon Agreement, : The Legal Text.

Secondary Sources

Ø Bin Cheng, The 1967 Outer Space Treaty: Thirtieth Anniversary. In: Air and Space Law, Kluwer Law International. Vol. XXIII, N. 4/5, October 1998, p. 158.

Ø DR. Harnam Bhayana, International Law In The Regime Of Outer Space, Chapter – 5, Militarisation of Outer Space, (R.Cambray & Co. Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 2001), p. 162.

Ø Peter Jankowitsch, Space Law – Development and Scope, Chapter-11, Legal Aspects of Military Space Activities, (Int’l Institue of Space Law, London, 1992), p.143.

Ø Bhat B Sandeepa, D Shyamala, Outer Space Law From Theory To Practice, Chapter – 5, China’s Anti – Satellite Misssile Test- Political and Legal Ramifications, (The Icfai University Press, Hyderabad, 2009), p. 110.

Ø Bin Cheng, Studies in Intl Space Law, Chapter 19, Definitional Issues in Space Law: the ‘Peaceful Use’ of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 513.

Articles

§ Hakeem Ijaiya, The Int’l Legal Regime Regulating Environmental Aspects Of Outer Space, Proceedings of the 7th International Conference of the Indian Society of International Law (2010) 207-213 Published by The Indian Society of International Law, available at:

< http://www.law.unilorin.edu.ng/publications/private/ho_ijaiya/11.pdf>, accessed on: 21-01-2015.

§ Chayes, Abram, Chayes Antonia Handler, Spitzer Eliot, Space Weapons: The Legal Context, Daedalus, (Vol. 114, No. 3), Weapons in Space, Vol. II: Implications for Security (Summer, 1985), pp. 193-218, The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences, available at:

<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.nujs.ac.in/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/20024990.pdf?acceptTC=true >, accessed on:21-01-2015.

§ Menon P.K., Stover William James, DEMILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 4, No. 2 (APR-JUN 1987), pp. 127-150, available: <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.nujs.ac.in/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/20751127.pdf?acceptTC=true>, accessed on: 21-01-2015.

§ V.S. Vereshchetin, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE IN THE GENERAL LEGAL FIELD (COMMONALITY AND PARTICULARITIES), available at:

< http://njasentuliyana.tripod.com/innaug_NJ_lecture.pdf >, accessed on: 21-01-2015.

§ Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, The Law of War in Space, (Air Force Law Review, 13 Mar. 2001), available at:

< http://www.space4peace.org/slaw/lawofwar.htm#sixb >, accessed on : 24-01-2015.

§ Cherian Jijo George, Abraham Job, Concept of Private Property in Space – An Analysis, Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, (2007) Vol. 2, Issue 4, available at:

<https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CE0QFjAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jiclt.com%2Findex.php%2Fjiclt%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F34%2F33&ei=78TNVMWgNoi3mwXU2ILoBw&usg=AFQjCNFFzszuzEBoK7VfHEabgkUMibNBMQ&sig2=BP1xsgV0L4WQL48km8Xk7g&bvm=bv.85076809,d.dGY >, accessed on: 25-01-2015.

§ Johannes M. WOLFF, ‘Peaceful uses’ of outer space has permitted its militarization—does it also mean its weaponization?, available at:

<https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=15&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDUQFjAEOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F47790%2Fichaptersection_singledocument%2Fb8cca3fe-50d6-4aaa-afc8-fd5c65f7c9cc%2Fen%2F03_Militarization%2Band%2BWeaponization%2Bof%2BOuter%2BSpace.pdf&ei=uy7JVLiLC4HKmwWd9YAQ&usg=AFQjCNFH3kyhAL6RlBSVWKsz0BQJuNbBgA&sig2=fIgAV0ZNmrvPfGqNnaolew&bvm=bv.84607526,d.dGY >, accessed on: 22-01-2015.

§ Maogoto Jackson Nyamuya, Freeland Steven, Space Weaponization and the United Nations Charter Regime on Force: A Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist?, available at:

<https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:1b5800&datastreamId=POST-PEER-REVIEW-NON-PUBLISHERS.PDF>, accessed on: 27-01-2015.

§ DIESEC, Topic A: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, available at: <http://ncku-mun.weebly.com/study-guide.html>, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

§ Johannes M. WOLFF, Peaceful uses’ of outer space has permitted its militarization— does it also mean its weaponization?, available at: <http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/making-space-for-security-en-346.pdf>, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

§ Zedalis Rex, Wade Catherine, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, University of Tulsa College of Law TU Law Digital Commons, available at:

<http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1152&context=fac_pub>, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

§ DR. Harnam Bhayana, International Law In The Regime Of Outer Space, Chapter – 5, Militarisation of Outer Space, (R.Cambray & Co. Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 2001), p. 162. See also: Peter Jankowitsch, Space Law – Development and Scope, Chapter-11, Legal Aspects of Military Space Activities, (Int’l Institue of Space Law, London, 1992), p.143.

§ Bhat B Sandeepa, D Shyamala, Outer Space Law From Theory To Practice, Chapter – 5, China’s Anti – Satellite Misssile Test- Political and Legal Ramifications, (The Icfai University Press, Hyderabad, 2009), p. 110.

§ Alvin M. Saperstein, Weaponization versus Militarization of Space, (APS Newsletter, July 2002), available at: < http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2002/july/saperstein.pdf>, accessed on: 12-02-2015.

§ DISEC, Disarmament and International Security Council, Topic 2: Futuristic DISEC: Weaponization of Space, available at:<http://www.sisindia.net/sis/sismun/archive/sismun/html/committee-reports/DISEC2.pdf>, accessed on:12-02-2015.

§ MILITARIZATION, WEAPONIZATION AND THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN THE OUTER SPACE (PAROS), available at: <http://www.muimun.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/DISEC-2014-Research-Report-Topic-A.pdf>, accessed on: 12-02-2015.

§ GA - DISEC, LNMIT MUN’15 Background Guide, available at:

<http://plinth.lnmiit.ac.in/mun/mun/BACKGROUND_GUIDE_GA-DISEC.pdf>, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

§ Kiran Nair, Trends in Space Weaponization and Militarization – The PPWT & Space Code Of Conduct, available at:

<https://www.academia.edu/7929457/Trends_In_Space_Weaponization_and_Militarization_-_The_PPWT_and_Space_Code_of_Conduct >, accessed on: 12-02-2015.

§ China-UN,Existing International Legal Instruments and Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space,available at: <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/cjjk/cjjzzdh/t199363.htm>, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

§ Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, The Law of War in Space, (Air Force Law Review, 13 Mar. 2001), available at: <http://www.space4peace.org/slaw/lawofwar.htm>, accessed on : 12-02-2015.

§ IAEA, Chapter 10, The Test Ban Treaty, available at:

< http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull15-4/15403500322.pdf >, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

§ Karl P. Muller, Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate, (Astropolitics, v. 1, No. 1, Summer 2003), pp. 4-28, available at: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1076.html>, accessed on: 14-02-2015.

§ Art. 5 of ABM Treaty. See also: Chapter – 5, ASAT Arms Control: History, available at: <https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1985/8502/850207.PDF>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

§ Lakoff Sanford A., Frank Herbert , A Shield in Space?: Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative, available at:

<https://books.google.co.in/books?id=a5vAs3d1TmkC&pg=PA174&lpg=PA174&dq=loopholes+of+abm+treaty+with+respect+to+space+weaponization&source=bl&ots=l3cizPlEGH&sig=Sp28tiPoWo_yCgJhEESlNdEMVVM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=71oEVcLED5WiuQTv7YCYDQ&ved=0CDoQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=loopholes%20of%20abm%20treaty%20with%20respect%20to%20space%20weaponization&f=false>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

§ Bhupendra Jasani, Space Weapons and Int’l Security, available at:

<https://books.google.co.in/books?id=Pd8yFSYTtKUC&pg=PA156&lpg=PA156&dq=loopholes+of+abm+treaty+with+respect+to+space+weaponization&source=bl&ots=OBg-Wrawqy&sig=1qAsXHJsFUQY7Y06A2K8GT4_u-A&hl=en&sa=X&ei=2m0EVc6bIYuyuASYwYAQ&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=loopholes%20of%20abm%20treaty%20with%20respect%20to%20space%20weaponization&f=false>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

§ Arms Control and the U.S. Russian Relationship, IV. THE ABM TREATY AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, available at: <http://fas.org/spp/eprint/cfr_nc_4.htm>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

§ NTI, Treaty on Limitation of ABM Treaty, available at: <http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-limitation-anti-ballistic-missile-systems-abm-treaty/>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

§ Krepo Michael, Katz-Hyman Michael, Space Weapons and Proliferation, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, July 2005, available at:

<http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/researchpdfs/Space_Weapons_and_Proliferation.pdf>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

§ The Nuclear Info. Project, ABM Treaty Chronology, available at: <http://fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/chron.htm>, accessed on: 14-03-2015.

§ Andrew Quinn, New Environment, Old Fears: The Security Dilemma and the Absence of a Prohibition on Space Weapons, available at: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/25839/20130610%20-%20A.Quinn%20MSc%20Thesis%20(FINAL).pdf?sequence=1>, accessed on: 14-03-2015.

§ Bhat Sandeepa, V. Kiran Mohan, ASAT Missile testing: A challenge to Art. IV of the OST, available at:

<http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/3CC9A6F0-677A-4385-BF1F-E290A03B22C1.pdf>, accessed on: 14-03-2015.

§ Joan Johnson-Freese, Thomas M. Nichols, Space, Security, and the New Nuclear Triad, available at:

<https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9324932-a61c-4ad4-9626-8e9978b455f7/Johnson-Freese-and-Nichols.aspx>, accessed on: 14-03-2015.

§ George Bernhardt Sandra M. Gresko Thomas R. Merry, Star Wars versus Star Laws: Does SDI Conform to Outer Space Law;The Reagan Legacy and the Strategic Defense Initiative: Note, Journal of Legislation Volume 15 Issue 2 (Article 14), (Jan. 5th 1989), available at:

<http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1319&context=jleg>, accessed on: 15-03-2015.

§ Longstreth Thomas K., Pike John E., U.S. Soviet Programmes threaten ABM Treaty, Vol. 3, No. 3 Dec. 1985, available at:

<https://books.google.co.in/books?id=yAYAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA6&lpg=PA6&dq=justification+of+star+wars+programme+under+ABM+Treaty&source=bl&ots=qCTN6Hx05R&sig=NFoTLwSxQPwDSboQJtApFXQ61o0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=BXoFVdiyD4O6uAT7jIKoCA&ved=0CEMQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=justification%20of%20star%20wars%20programme%20under%20ABM%20Treaty&f=false>, accessed on: 15-03-2015.

§ Bruce M. Deblois, The Advent of Space Weapons, Astropolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring, pp. 29-53, (Frank Cass, London 2003),

availableat: <https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FBergman_11ast03.pdf&ei=5bfcVNXWE8y1uQShnoHoCQ&usg=AFQjCNH-NkGZTPGhikrIYntoqrqEytn3gg&bvm=bv.85761416,d.c2E >, accessed on:12-02-2015.

4.

References:

[1] Hakeem Ijaiya, The Int’l Legal Regime Regulating Environmental Aspects Of Outer Space, Proceedings of the 7th International Conference of the Indian Society of International Law (2010) 207-213 Published by The Indian Society of International Law, available at:

< http://www.law.unilorin.edu.ng/publications/private/ho_ijaiya/11.pdf>, accessed on: 21-01-2015.

2 Chayes, Abram, Chayes Antonia Handler, Spitzer Eliot, Space Weapons: The Legal Context, Daedalus, (Vol. 114, No. 3), Weapons in Space, Vol. II: Implications for Security (Summer, 1985), pp. 193-218, The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences, available at:

< http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.nujs.ac.in/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/20024990.pdf?acceptTC=true >, accessed on:21-01-2015.

3 Menon P.K., Stover William James, DEMILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 4, No. 2 (APR-JUN 1987), pp. 127-150, available at: <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.nujs.ac.in/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/20751127.pdf?acceptTC=true>, accessed on: 21-01-2015.

4 Prof. Bin Cheng, in his lecture devoted to the thirtieth anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty.

5 Bin Cheng, The 1967 Outer Space Treaty: Thirtieth Anniversary. In: Air and Space Law, Kluwer Law

International. Vol. XXIII, N. 4/5, October 1998, p. 158. See Also: V.S. Vereshchetin, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE IN THE GENERAL LEGAL FIELD (COMMONALITY AND PARTICULARITIES), available at:

< http://njasentuliyana.tripod.com/innaug_NJ_lecture.pdf >, accessed on: 21-01-2015.

6 Supra, N. 3, at page 129.

7 Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, The Law of War in Space, (Air Force Law Review, 13 Mar. 2001), available at: < http://www.space4peace.org/slaw/lawofwar.htm#sixb >, accessed on : 24-01-2015.

8 Cherian Jijo George, Abraham Job, Concept of Private Property in Space – An Analysis, Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, (2007) Vol. 2, Issue 4, available at:

<https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CE0QFjAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jiclt.com%2Findex.php%2Fjiclt%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F34%2F33&ei=78TNVMWgNoi3mwXU2ILoBw&usg=AFQjCNFFzszuzEBoK7VfHEabgkUMibNBMQ&sig2=BP1xsgV0L4WQL48km8Xk7g&bvm=bv.85076809,d.dGY >, accessed on: 25-01-2015.

9 Infra, N. 7.

10 Ibid.

11 Supra, N. 7.

12 Ibid.

13 Id.

14 Resolution 1348 (XIII), reprinted in 4 MANUAL ON SPACE LAw 492 (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee ed. 1981). See also Resolution 1148 (XII). This resolution focused on disarmament in general, and thus is not strictly a resolution respecting space law. Passed soon after the launch of Sputnik 1, this resolution expressed a

concern that objects sent into outer space be used "exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes." C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 13. (Emphasis Added).

15 James J. Trimble, International Law of Outer Space and its Effect on Commercial Space Activity, available at:<http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1932&context=plr>, accessed on: 25-01-2015.

16 Gorove Stephen, Finch Edward R. Jr., Sanders Benjamin, Small David, Vogt Donald A., Arms Control in Outer Space, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 76(APRIL 22-24, 1982), pp. 284-297, available at:

<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.nujs.ac.in/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/25658139.pdf?acceptTC=true >, accessed on: 25-01-2015.

17 Ibid.

18 In their article “Arms Control in Outer Space”, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 76(APRIL 22-24, 1982), pp. 284-297.

19 Supra, N.12.

20C. CHRISTOL, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 113, 113-14 (Jan. 28, 1984).

21Infra. N. 13.

22Johannes M. WOLFF, ‘Peaceful uses’ of outer space has permitted its militarization—does it also mean its weaponization?, available at:

<https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=15&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDUQFjAEOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F47790%2Fichaptersection_singledocument%2Fb8cca3fe-50d6-4aaa-afc8-fd5c65f7c9cc%2Fen%2F03_Militarization%2Band%2BWeaponization%2Bof%2BOuter%2BSpace.pdf&ei=uy7JVLiLC4HKmwWd9YAQ&usg=AFQjCNFH3kyhAL6RlBSVWKsz0BQJuNbBgA&sig2=fIgAV0ZNmrvPfGqNnaolew&bvm=bv.84607526,d.dGY >, accessed on: 27-01-2015.

23Ibid.

24MAOGOTO JACKSON NYAMUYA, FREELAND STEVEN, Space Weaponization and the United Nations Charter Regime on Force: A Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist?, available at: <https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:1b5800&datastreamId=POST-PEER-REVIEW-NON-PUBLISHERS.PDF>, accessed on: 27-01-2015.

25Supra, N. 24.

26Ibid.

27Id.

28Id..

29Supra, N. 13.

30Ibid.

31Ibid.

32Supra. N. 22.

33Ibid.

34DIESEC, Topic A: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, available at:

<http://ncku-mun.weebly.com/study-guide.html>, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

35Supra, N. 28.

36Ibid.

37Id.

38Id.

39Id.

40Id.

41Id.

42Johannes M. WOLFF, Peaceful uses’ of outer space has permitted its militarization— does it also mean its weaponization?, available at: <http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/making-space-for-security-en-346.pdf>, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

43Ibid.

44Id.

45Id.

46Bin Cheng, Studies in Intl Space Law, Chapter 19, Definitional Issues in Space Law: the ‘Peaceful Use’ of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 513.

47Ibid.

48Zedalis Rex, Wade Catherine, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, University of Tulsa College of Law TU Law Digital Commons, available at:

<http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1152&context=fac_pub>, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

49Basically it is the view held by the U.S. and other Western powers.

50Supra, N. 48.

51Ibid.

52Soviet Union and other nations

53Infra, N. 50

54Ibid.

55Id.

56Supra, N. 48.

57DR. Harnam Bhayana, International Law In The Regime Of Outer Space, Chapter – 5, Militarisation of Outer Space, (R.Cambray & Co. Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 2001), p. 162. See also: Peter Jankowitsch, Space Law – Development and Scope, Chapter-11, Legal Aspects of Military Space Activities, (Int’l Institue of Space Law, London, 1992), p.143.

58Ibid.

59Bhat B Sandeepa, D Shyamala, Outer Space Law From Theory To Practice, Chapter – 5, China’s Anti – Satellite Misssile Test- Political and Legal Ramifications, (The Icfai University Press, Hyderabad, 2009), p. 110.

60Alvin M. Saperstein, Weaponization versus Militarization of Space, (APS Newsletter, July 2002), available at: < http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2002/july/saperstein.pdf>, accessed on: 12-02-2015.

61Ibid.

62DISEC, Disarmament and International Security Council, Topic 2: Futuristic DISEC: Weaponization of Space, available at:<http://www.sisindia.net/sis/sismun/archive/sismun/html/committee-reports/DISEC2.pdf>, accessed on:12-02-2015. More at: Annex. 1.

63Ibid.

64Id.

65MILITARIZATION, WEAPONIZATION AND THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN THE OUTER SPACE (PAROS), available at: <http://www.muimun.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/DISEC-2014-Research-Report-Topic-A.pdf>, accessed on: 12-02-2015.

66Ibid.

67Id.

68Id.

69Id.

70Id.

71GA - DISEC, LNMIT MUN’15 Background Guide, available at:

<http://plinth.lnmiit.ac.in/mun/mun/BACKGROUND_GUIDE_GA-DISEC.pdf>, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

72MILITARIZATION, WEAPONIZATION AND THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN THE OUTER SPACE (PAROS), available at: <http://www.muimun.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/DISEC-2014-Research-Report-Topic-A.pdf>, accessed on: 12-02-2015.

73Kiran Nair, Trends in Space Weaponization and Militarization – The PPWT & Space Code Of Conduct, available at: < https://www.academia.edu/7929457/Trends_In_Space_Weaponization_and_Militarization_-_The_PPWT_and_Space_Code_of_Conduct >, accessed on: 12-02-2015.

74China-UN,Existing International Legal Instruments and Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space,available at: <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/cjjk/cjjzzdh/t199363.htm>, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

75(Problem of Universality), More at : Ibid.

76Supra, N. 68.

77Ibid.

78Chayes Abram, Chayes Antonia Handler, Spitzer Eliot, Space Weapons: The Legal Context, (Daedalus, Vol. 114, No. 3, Weapons in Space, Vol. II: Implications for Security (Summer, 1985), pp. 193-218), available at:

<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.nujs.ac.in/stable/pdf/20024990>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

79Kiran Nair, Trends in Space Weaponization and Militarization – The PPWT & Space Code Of Conduct, available at: < https://www.academia.edu/7929457/Trends_In_Space_Weaponization_and_Militarization_-_The_PPWT_and_Space_Code_of_Conduct >, accessed on: 12-02-2015.

80Ibid.

81Id.

82Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, The Law of War in Space, (Air Force Law Review, 13 Mar. 2001), available at: <http://www.space4peace.org/slaw/lawofwar.htm>, accessed on : 12-02-2015.

83Ibid.

84Id.

85Id.

86Id.

87IAEA, Chapter 10, The Test Ban Treaty, available at:

< http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull15-4/15403500322.pdf >, accessed on: 15-02-2015.

88Ibid.

89Supra, N.86.

90Ibid.

91Karl P. Muller, Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate, (Astropolitics, v. 1, No. 1, Summer 2003), pp. 4-28, available at: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1076.html>, accessed on: 14-02-2015.

92Art. 5 of ABM Treaty. See also: Chapter – 5, ASAT Arms Control: History, available at: <https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1985/8502/850207.PDF>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

93Supra, N. 78.

94 Ibid.

95Lakoff Sanford A., Frank Herbert , A Shield in Space?: Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative, available at:

<https://books.google.co.in/books?id=a5vAs3d1TmkC&pg=PA174&lpg=PA174&dq=loopholes+of+abm+treaty+with+respect+to+space+weaponization&source=bl&ots=l3cizPlEGH&sig=Sp28tiPoWo_yCgJhEESlNdEMVVM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=71oEVcLED5WiuQTv7YCYDQ&ved=0CDoQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=loopholes%20of%20abm%20treaty%20with%20respect%20to%20space%20weaponization&f=false>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

96 Bhupendra Jasani, Space Weapons and Int’l Security, available at:

<https://books.google.co.in/books?id=Pd8yFSYTtKUC&pg=PA156&lpg=PA156&dq=loopholes+of+abm+treaty+with+respect+to+space+weaponization&source=bl&ots=OBg-Wrawqy&sig=1qAsXHJsFUQY7Y06A2K8GT4_u-A&hl=en&sa=X&ei=2m0EVc6bIYuyuASYwYAQ&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=loopholes%20of%20abm%20treaty%20with%20respect%20to%20space%20weaponization&f=false>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

97 Arms Control and the U.S. Russian Relationship, IV. THE ABM TREATY AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, available at: <http://fas.org/spp/eprint/cfr_nc_4.htm>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

98 NTI, Treaty on Limitation of ABM Treaty, available at: <http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-limitation-anti-ballistic-missile-systems-abm-treaty/>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

99 Johannes M. WOLFF, Peaceful uses’ of outer space has permitted its militarization— does it also mean its weaponization?, available at:<http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/making-space-for-security-en-346.pdf >, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

100 Krepo Michael, Katz-Hyman Michael, Space Weapons and Proliferation, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, July 2005, available at:

<http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Space_Weapons_and_Proliferation.pdf>, accessed on: 12-03-2015.

101 The Nuclear Info. Project, ABM Treaty Chronology, available at: <http://fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/chron.htm>, accessed on: 14-03-2015.

102 Supra, N. 92.

103Ibid.More: This capability test includes future systems having components “based on other physical principles” than those of the ABM system components (interceptors, launchers, and radars) described in Article 11 of the treaty.

104 Id.

105Andrew Quinn, New Environment, Old Fears: The Security Dilemma and the Absence of a Prohibition on Space Weapons, available at: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/25839/20130610%20-%20A.Quinn%20MSc%20Thesis%20(FINAL).pdf?sequence=1>, accessed on: 14-03-2015.

106 Bhat Sandeepa, V. Kiran Mohan, ASAT Missile testing: A challenge to Art. IV of the OST, available at:

<http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/3CC9A6F0-677A-4385-BF1F-E290A03B22C1.pdf >, accessed on: 14-03-2015.

107 Ibid.

108Art. IX OST.

109 Infra, N. 106.

110Joan Johnson-Freese, Thomas M. Nichols, Space, Security, and the New Nuclear Triad, available at:

<https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9324932-a61c-4ad4-9626-8e9978b455f7/Johnson-Freese-and-Nichols.aspx>, accessed on: 14-03-2015.

111 Parkerson, supra note 3, at 102, n.195, 87-88

112 George Bernhardt Sandra M. Gresko Thomas R. Merry, Star Wars versus Star Laws: Does SDI Conform to Outer Space Law;The Reagan Legacy and the Strategic Defense Initiative: Note, Journal of Legislation Volume 15 Issue 2 (Article 14), (Jan. 5th 1989), available at:

<http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1319&context=jleg>, accessed on: 15-03-2015.

113 Ibid.

114 Id.

115Id.

116 Id.

117 Supra, N. 112.

118Ibid.

119Id.

120Id.

121Id.

122Id.

123Id.

124Id.

125Longstreth Thomas K., Pike John E., U.S. Soviet Programmes threaten ABM Treaty, Vol. 3, No. 3 Dec. 1985, available at:

<https://books.google.co.in/books?id=yAYAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA6&lpg=PA6&dq=justification+of+star+wars+programme+under+ABM+Treaty&source=bl&ots=qCTN6Hx05R&sig=NFoTLwSxQPwDSboQJtApFXQ61o0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=BXoFVdiyD4O6uAT7jIKoCA&ved=0CEMQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=justification%20of%20star%20wars%20programme%20under%20ABM%20Treaty&f=false>, accessed on: 15-03-2015.

126Ibid.

127MILITARIZATION, WEAPONIZATION AND THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN THE OUTER SPACE (PAROS), available at: <http://www.muimun.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/DISEC-2014-Research-Report-Topic-A.pdf>, accessed on: 14-03-2015.

128Ibid.

129 Supra, N. 92.

130Supra, N. 105.

131Ibid.

132 Id.

133Id.

134Id.

135 Bruce M. Deblois, The Advent of Space Weapons, Astropolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring, pp. 29-53, (Frank Cass, London2003),available at:

<https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FBergman_11ast03.pdf&ei=5bfcVNXWE8y1uQShnoHoCQ&usg=AFQjCNH-NkGZTPGhikrIYntoqrqEytn3gg&bvm=bv.85761416,d.c2E >, accessed on:12-02-2015.

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