INDIA CEMENT CARTEL CASE

INDIA CEMENT CARTEL CASE

Addressing the issues of cartelization of the cement industry by making a case study based research in the India Cement Case.
1.

CHAPTER – I

Introduction

In India, the Competition Act, 2002 is the crucial legislation which deals with Competition Law. Section 3 of the Competition Act deals with anticompetitive agreements, including cartels.[1] Cartelisation is one of the horizontal agreements that shall be presumed to have appreciable adverse effect on competition under Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002.[2]

Section 2(c) of the Competition Act, 2002 defines “Cartel” which includes:

“an association of producers, sellers, distributors, traders, or service providers who, by agreement among themselves, limit, control, or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale, or price of, or trade in, goods or provision of services.”[3]

In simple terms, a cartel is essentially an agreement among competitors to fix prices or production quantities or allocate markets or customers, either by limiting supply in the market or otherwise altering distribution patterns.[4]

Why do firms indulge in cartelization?[5] The reason behind the firms colluding can be best explained by referring to the ‘game-theory’[6] and the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’[7]game.[8]

The success of the collusion will depend upon two major factors:

(i) whether the firms are able to reach an agreement and

(ii) whether the coordination can be sustained over a period of time.[9]

Generally, the firms loathe competition, cause it is the competition, which, drives away profits and takes away their freedom over market activities, for e.g. pricing and output from their control.[10] In any market, therefore, competing firms have an incentive to coordinate their production and pricing activities so as to simulate like a monopoly, in order to increase their collective and individual profits by limiting the market output and raising the market price.[11] Collusion among independent firms in the same industry to co-ordinate pricing, production or marketing practices in order to limit competition, maximise market power and affect market prices is referred to as a “cartel”.[12]

The definition of cartel under the Competition Act warrants that any conclusion of cartelization can be arrived at only upon proof of:

1. an agreement;

2. among producers, sellers, distributors, traders, or service providers;

3. to limit, control, or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale, or price of, or trade in, goods or provision of services.[13]

In order to prove that there is existence of a cartel, first it is necessary to establish that the existence of an agreement be proved by the investigating body.[14] But, the term “agreement” is firstly, very widely defined under the Act; and secondly, evidence of an agreement is neither necessary nor will it, in general circumstances, be readily available as such conspiracies are often hatched in secrecy.[15]

The CCI, in its order, in the case of All India Tyre Dealers’ Federation v. Tyre Manufacturers (“Tyre Case”)[16], has held that the existence of an specific agreement is not required and the same can be inferred from the intention or conduct of parties. Further, in the case of conspiracy, proof of a formal agreement may not be available and can be established by circumstantial evidence alone.[17]

By virtue of powers conferred under Sec. 19 of the Act, the Commission may inquire into any alleged contravention under section 3 (3) of the Act that provides for cartels.[18] The Commission, if it is satisfied that there is existence of a prima facie case of ‘cartel’, it shall direct the Director General to cause an investigation and furnish a report.[19]

The Commission is empowered to inquire into any cartel, and to impose on each member of the cartel, a penalty of up to 3 times its profit for each year of the continuance of such agreement or 10% of its turnover for each year of continuance of such agreement, whichever is higher. In case an enterprise is a ‘company’ its directors/officials who are guilty are also liable to be proceeded against.[20]

Scope of the Study:

The researcher has focused purely on only those legal regulations which deals with the cartelisation in a given market. In this research the researcher has focused on the issues of cartelization of cement industry by making a case study based research in the India Cement Case.

The primary evidence used in this research includes the text of the Competition Act, 2002. The secondary evidence used in this research includes various works of authors and research scholars on this topic which have ultimately proved very helpful in providing useful and effective material for this instant project.

Research Questions:

The researcher in dealing with the aforementioned problem is going to deal with the following research questions which will suffice the object and purpose of the research. They are mentioned here-in-below:-

Ø What is the problem of Cement Cartelization in India? Explain with reference to India Cement Cartel Case.

Ø What are the defences against cartelization?

Ø Which legislation is more suitably qualified to tackle Cartel cases out of the two legislations viz. The MRTP Act, 1969 and The Competition Act, 2002?

Chapterization:

The Chapterization of this research project is as follows:

Chapter One is the Introductory Chapter in which the researcher has provided a brief overview regarding the agreements which are regarded as anti-competitive in nature, the meaning of cartelisation and the reason behind the companies indulging in such activities.

Also, the powers of the CCI under the Competition Law with regard to the regulation and the action to be taken in such situations. It also contains the scope of the study, issues raised by the researcher and the methodology that is being followed while dealing with the current project topic.

Chapter Two deals with the problem of Cement Cartelization in India in which a detailed analysis of the India Cement Case has been discussed.

Chapter Three deals with the Defences against Cartelisation that an accused can take.

Chapter Four deals with the comparative analysis of the provisions under the MRTP and Competition Act, 2002.

Lastly, Chapter Five deals with the Conclusion and Suggestions which is the concluding chapter of this project.

CHAPTER - II

PROBLEM OF CEMENT CARTELIZATION IN INDIA

After the government decontrol of cement prices in 1989, there was a common credence that the cement manufacturers have been engaging in collusive price fixing.[21] The CMA after such decontrol started pressing for higher prices and indulging in collective activities.[22]

It is pertinent to note that the cement is a homogenous product, which is susceptible to cartelization.[23] As the nature of the market is mostly fragmented, it is at the whims and caprices of the sellers with regard to how to dominate the market.[24]

For the very first time in the year 1991, the Indian Cement Industry was accused of cartelization in which the MRTPC was asked to adjudge on the matter of collusive price setting in the Delhi market.[25]

The Case of Cement Cartelization in India:

CASE COMMENT ON INDIA CEMENT CARTEL CASE:

2.1 Brief history of the cement industry in light of the present case :

In the year 2007-08, the BAI had alleged that the retail prices fixed by 11 members of the CMA were almost similar.[26] Thereafter, the investigation was first handed to the SFIO and later to CCI.[27] The BAI had filed a complaint with the CCI against the CMA and other cement companies, regarding their indulging activities, which amounts to cartelization resulting in impelling the increase in price of the cement, vide Case No.29/2010.[28] On 15 September 2010, the CCI formed a prima facie opinion on the contravention of the Competition Act, 2002 and directed investigations in the matter.[29] On 31 May 2011, the DG submitted his report which provided for contravention of the Competition Act by the respondents.[30]

The full bench of CCI called and heard comments and objections from the respondents, thereafter considering their submissions came to the conclusion that the respondents had contravened sections 3(3) (a) and (b) of the Competition Act.[31] After hearing all concerned parties, the full bench of the Commission delivered a unanimous order upholding the argument that has been put forward by BAI’s.[32]

2.2 Brief facts of the case:

a. Parties to the dispute and the complaint alleged by BAI: The decision of the CCI arise from the information filed by the BAI on 26 July 2010 against the following:

a. CMA,

b. Associated Cement Co. Ltd.,

c. Gujarat Ambuja Cements Limited (now Ambuja Cements Limited),

d. Ultratech Cement Ltd.,

e. Grasim Cements (now merged with Ultratech Cements),

f. Jaypee Cement

g. JK Cements (JK Group),

h. India Cements,

i. Madras Cement Ltd.,

j. Century Textiles & Industries Limited,

k. Binani Cement Ltd.,

l. Lafarge India Pvt. Ltd.[33]

The BAI, in its complaint, alleged that, in spite of having large capacities, these companies formed a cartel and manipulated the platform of CMA to synchronise the reduction of utilisation levels, thereby limiting supplies to the market, and hiking the prices of cement simultaneously and in uniformity.[34]

Following complaints from BAI, the CCI directed its director general (DG) of investigation in September 2010 to probe the matter and submit a report.[35] The DG, in its report submitted on 31 May 2011, concluded that the alleged cement companies had entered into several anti-competitive agreements in order to dominate the supply of cement.[36] Also, the companies used the platform of CMA and indulged in collusive price-fixing.[37]

b. How the cartel functioned:

According to the contention submitted to CCI by BAI, all the major cement producers together with CMA, divided the whole market into five zones, which enabled them to control the supply and fix prices by forming a cartel.[38] It is provided under the following figure[39]:

The DG’s investigation holds that, the CMA formed a high power committee and the prices of cement were discussed in its meetings.[40] Also, supposedly, the CMA nominated different companies in 34 different centres to collect and circulate the retail as well as the wholesale price over phone or through e-mails.[41]

Though CMA argued that it did so for the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, the DG retains its conclusion that the common platform of CMA was used for entering into anti-competitive agreements by companies.[42]

2.3 Issues that have arisen before the CCI and its subsequent findings on such issues:

Preliminary Issues:

i. Issue with regard to Jurisdiction:

The parties to the respondents had raised distress over the DG’s investigation and its dependency on data which was prior to 20 May 2009 (the date on which the provisions of Section 3 of the Competition Act were brought into force). The CCI held that mere examination of data prior to 20 May 2009 cannot be construed to mean that the provisions of the Competition Act have been applied retrospectively.[43]

ii. Failure to provide opportunity to cross examination:

The respondents submitted that the DG did not give them an opportunity to cross examine witnesses relied upon by him.[44] The CCI while rejecting this contention of the respondents, stated that by giving the respondents the chance to submit oral and written evidence before it, the proceedings were applied in accordance with the principles of natural justice.[45]

iii. Incorrect reliance on motivated information and press reports:

The respondents stated that the information filed by the BAI was driven and targeted.[46] CCI rejected this argument and held that under the scheme of the Competition Act, the final outcome was to be determined on the basis of an inquiry after going into the questions whether competition forces were being inhibited due to certain anti-competitive behaviour.[47]

Substantive Issues:

The substantive question before the CCI was Issue 1 : Whether the behaviour of the cement companies violated Section 3 of the Indian Competition Act, 2002?[48] With respect to violations of sections 3(1) (a) and (b), the CCI scrutinized the following facts and findings:

i. Market Structure of the Cement Industry:

With respect to established market structure the CCI observed that: Whether there was an abuse of dominant position.[49] But, subsequently, it found out that the market was distinguished by several players and no single firm or group was in a clear stand to function independent of cut-throat fierceness or affect its competitors or consumers in its favour.[50] Due to the oligopolistic nature of the market, collusion between companies is possible and can be substantiated with the help of circumstantial evidence.[51]

ii. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove violation:

Primarily the Cement Companies objected that the DG failed to support his findings with any direct evidence.[52] The CCI, in conformance with the international practice, held that due to the coverted nature of cartels, circumstantial evidence is on equal footing with respect to direct evidence in order to prove cartelisation.[53]

iii. Section 3 does not require a delineation of relevant market:

The CCI has held that for an inquiry under section 3 of the Competition Act, there is no requirement under the Competition Act to determine a ‘relevant market’.[54]

iv. CMA is engaged in collecting competition sensitive data:

The parties to the respondents argued that CMA collects retail and wholesale prices data from different sects of the country and communicate them to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in India, as per the requirement under the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (Ministry of Commerce and Industry in India).[55] The CCI held that the perpetuators were colluding using the platform of the CMA and this gave them an chance to decide upon and fix prices.[56]

Also, the CCI held that the CMA publishes statistics on manufacture and consignment of each company (factory wise) and circulates such information amongst its members.[57] The sharing of price, production and dispatch data makes co-ordination easier amongst the cement companies.[58]

Ø High Power Committee Meetings:

The CCI took notice of the fact that the cement prices increased immediately after the High Power Committee Meetings of the CMA which were attended by the cement companies in January-February in the year 2011.[59] It further pointed that ACC and ACL, although they had cease to be members of the CMA, attended these meetings.[60]

The CCI observed that although ACC and ACL had admitted that they had attended these meetings, both CMA and JAL refused their presence.[61] The inconsistencies in the statements of the different parties to respondents convinced CCI that they were interested in covering up material information.[62]

Ø Price Parallelism:

The respondents argued that the correlation benchmark of 0.5 taken by the DG (in its economic analysis of price data) was illogical.[63] Also, the prices used by the DG were incomparable since the prices submitted by the companies differed from each other (some had submitted gross prices, while others had submitted depot prices, average retail prices etc.).[64]

The CCI while rejecting these arguments held that given the nature of data exchanged between the parties, price parallelism could not be a reflection of non-collusive oligopolistic market conditions.[65]

Ø Limiting and controlling production:

The respondents provided evidence to show that capacity utilisation was on the rise contrary to the DG Report to CCI suggested that the magnitude utilisation increased during the period of last four years, the production has not increased proportionately during this period.[66]

But the CCI held that on a year on year and plant wise basis, the capacity utilisation across the respondents had decreased.[67]

Ø Limiting and controlling the supply:

The CCI held that the data regarding the forces of demand and supply stated that the dispatch figures should have been more than or equal to consumption of cement in the corresponding period of the previous year.[68] But, much to the surprise, in the months of November and December 2010, the dispatch was lower than the actual consumption for the corresponding months of 2009.[69] Based on this fact the CCI held that the lower dispatches coupled with the lower utilisation establishes that the cement companies indulged in controlling and limiting the supply of cement in the market.[70]

Ø Production Parallelism and Price Leadership:

According to the CCI, in November – December 2010 the cement companies reduced production collectively, although during the same period in 2009, the production of the cement companies differed which clearly establish a well co-ordinated behaviour.[71]Also, the CCI came to the conclusion that the price leaders gave price signals through advanced media reporting which made it easier for other manufactures to co-ordinate their strategies.[72]

Ø Factors set out in Section 19(3) of the Competition Act:

The CCI has stated that where contraventions of sections 3(3) (a) and (b) are proved, the adverse effect on competition is presumed.[73]

After hearing parties Commission states that the following substantive issues[74] arise for determination in the case.

Issue 2: Whether there is existence of an agreement among the cement companies under which they share details of cement prices, production and capacities among each other by manipulating the platform of CMA?

Issue 3: If yes; then whether they have directly or indirectly indulged in deciding the prices of cement?

Issue 4: Whether there is a case of production and dispatch parallelism among the Opposite Parties?

On issue No.2 to 4: The CCI by virtue of Sec. 2(b) holds that the existence of a written agreement is not necessary to establish common understanding, common design, common motive, common intent or commonality of approach among the parties to an anti-competitive agreement.[75] Also it holds that, in the absence of any documentary evidence of existence of an agreement, it is appropriate, correct and logical to inquire into cases of anti-competitive agreements on the basis of existence of evidences which establish that particular set of act and conduct of the market participants cannot be explained but for some sort of anticompetitive agreement and action in concert among them.[76]

Issue 5: Whether the aforesaid acts of the Opposite Parties have caused increase in the prices of cement?

The Commission observed that in on-going cartel activity where prices are being kept high over a long period of time, it is not necessary that prices would increase after every meeting, and that prices had increased after the two meetings as brought out by DG in his investigation raising suspicion of coordinated action and discussion among the Opposite parties as regards prices.[77]

2.4 Order by the CCI:

The CCI imposed penalties on the respondents which is depicted in the table[78] as below:

2.

Also, the CMA was fined 10% of its total receipts for the past two years and has been directed by CCI to disengage and disassociate itself from collecting wholesale and retail prices through the member cement companies and also from circulating the details on production and dispatches of cement companies to its members.[79] Moreover, direction had been provided to respondents regarding making of payments to the above penalties within 90 days of the receipt of the CCI order.[80]

CHAPTER - III

DEFENCES AGAINST CARTELIZATION

There are several defences which can be raised by the firms or companies accused of Cartelization. They are explained as below:

q Price parallelism:

It acts as a defence against cartelised price fixation.[81] It is commonly used as an viable defence, posing a challenge for competition authorities.[82] Under the US, EU and Brazil, there is an tendency to consider parallel behavior as a first clue pointing to the presence of collusion.[83] Although parallelism does not suffice by itself to prove unlawful conduct, it may provide for forming a suspicion of illegality.[84]

q Increase in Input Cost as defence for Price Increase:

The Competition Act provides for various factors that decides the existence of a cartel.[85] CCI needs to look into all the factors, before taking the input cost as a defence against cartelisation.[86]

q Presence of Gateways:

Under the Competition Act, 2002, there is no presence of Public Interest gateway.[87] It is as such because if the Cartel activity is ‘presumed’ to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition, the burden would be placed on the accused to justify that the practice did not have any noteworthy impact on competition in the market and they would have to rely upon the factors listed in the Act and other circumstantial evidence to avail this defence.[88]

Justification of one’s own activity of cartelisation on the basis that the accused is itself a dominant player in the market

In a buyer-supplier relationship, for ex. if, the buyer-firm happens to be a dominant firm, the supplier-firms may have an advantage to enter into a cartel-type agreement to counter the dominant position of the buyer.[89]

Acceptance of anonymous complaint to initiate an Enquiry

Section 19 of the Competition Act grants authority to the Commission to start an investigation on the basis of a reference from the Central Government or the State Government or a statutory authority or on its own accord with the information available which also allows the Commission to accept an anonymous complaint to form a basis for further investigation.[90]

CHAPTER – IV

The MRTP Act, 1969 v/s The Competition Act, 2002

The provisions under the MRTP Act, 1969 and the Competition Act, 2002 are compared as follows:

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

The Competition Act is formulated generally in reasonable terms and is not limited to regulation of commercial acts of private parties.[101] Basically, the Competition Act prohibits or regulates the following:

i) Anti-competitive agreements (u/s 3 of the Act)

ii) Abuse of dominant position (u/s 4 of the Act)

iii) Combinations (u/s 5 & 6 of the Act).[102]

One of the biggest failings of the MRTP Act was the inadequacy of MRTP Act to provide adequate remedy to complainants. Except for orders directing a respondent to ‘cease and desist’ from the alleged monopolistic, restrictive or unfair trade practices the MRTP Commission could not impose penalties for breach of law and; no other penalty or fine could be imposed. Secondly, it is a generally accepted principle that competition law has extraterritorial application in all the cases where the overseas conduct of defendant distorts competition in the domestic market. However the Supreme Court repeatedly refused to acknowledge this principle and had held that the wording of MRTP Act did not provide for extra territorial jurisdiction. Thirdly, MRTP Act did not define certain key terms such as abuse of dominance, cartels, collusion, pricefixing, bid rigging, boycotts, refusal to deal and predatory pricing.

3.

References

[1] Shroff Cyril, Kaur Uberoi Nisha, Cartel Enforcement in India: Standard and Burden of Proof, CPI Antitrust Chronicle February 2013 (1), available at: <http://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/india.pdf>, accessed on: 01-02-2015.

[2] CCI, Competition Act 2002: Provisions Relating To Cartels, available at: <www.cci.gov.in/menu/cartels.pdf>, accessed on: 01-02-2015.

[3] Infra, N. 1.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Nidhi Singh, Cement Cartelisation in India and Europe, available at:

< http://cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/NidhiInterns160311.pdf>, accessed on: 01-02-2015.

[6] The modeling of economic decisions by games whose outcome depends on the decisions taken by two or more agents, each having to make decisions without information on what choices the others are making. Game theory distinguishes between one-off games and repeated games, where reputation established through earlier games affects the conduct of subsequent ones. Game theory is widely used in analyzing both industrial organization and economic policy. (Emphasis added) available at:

< http://cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/NidhiInterns160311.pdf>, accessed on: 01-02-2015.

[7] A game theory concept showing the disadvantages of not being able to reach binding agreements. The name originates from a situation of two prisoners who must each decide whether to confess without knowing what the other will say, where a lighter penalty follows if you confess when the other does not. For details see: John Black, Oxford Dictionary of Economics, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, Second Edition, 2002, at p. 368. (Emphasis added)

[8] Infra, N. 4.

[9] Supra, N. 4.

[10] CCI, Study of Cartel Case Laws in Select Jurisdictions – Learnings for the Competition Commission of India, available at:

< http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/completed/cartel_report1_20080812115152.pdf >, accessed on: 01-2-2015.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Id.

[13] Cyril Shroff & Nisha Kaur Uberoi Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A. Shroff & Co., Cartel Enforcement in India: Standard and Burden of Proof, CPI Antitrust Chronicle February 2013 (1), available at:

< http://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/india.pdf>, accessed on : 01-02-2015.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Id.

[16] RTPE No. 20/2008.

[17] Supra., N. 12.

[18] CCI, Competition Act 2002: Provisions Relating To Cartels, available at:<www.cci.gov.in/menu/cartels.pdf>, accessed on: 01-02-2015.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Id.

[21] Nidhi Singh, Cement Cartelisation in India and Europe, available at:

< http://cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/NidhiInterns160311.pdf>, accessed on: 01-02-2015.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] NDTV, Corporates, What is Cement Cartelisation issue all about?, Oct. 16, 2013 07:59 (IST), available at:

< http://profit.ndtv.com/news/corporates/article-what-is-cement-cartelisation-issue-all-about-306552>, accessed on: 02-02-2015.

[27] Ibid.

[28] CCI vindicates BAI’s stand, Cartelization By Cement Manufacturers, available at:

<http://www.baionline.in/media/data/Cement%20Cartelisation%20&%20BAI.pdf>, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

[29] Karan S. Chandiok, Summary of CCI’s Order Against Cement Companies, available at: <http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.in/2012/06/summary-of-ccis-order-against-cement.html>, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Id.

[32] Supra, N. 28.

[33]CCI Order, Builders Association Of India vs Cement Manufacturers, 20 June, 2012, available at:

< http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/CaseNo29of2010MainOrder.pdf>, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

[34] Supra N. 28.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39]Prince Mathews Thomas, CCI The Cement Cartel Of India, (Forbes India; July 18, 2012) available at:

< http://forbesindia.com/article/briefing/cci-the-cement-cartel-of-india/33354/1 >, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

[40] Even companies like ACC and Ambuja Cements, which had resigned from CMA, continued to participate in such meetings. (Emphasis Added)

[41] Supra N. 28.

[42] Ibid.

[43]Karan S. Chandiok, Summary of CCI’s Order Against Cement Companies, available at: <http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.in/2012/06/summary-of-ccis-order-against-cement.html>, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Id.

[46]Supra N. 43.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50]Id.

[51]Id.

[52]Id.

[53]Id.

[54]Supra N. 43.

[55]Ibid.

[56]Id.

[57]Id.

[58]Id.

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61]Karan S. Chandiok, Summary of CCI’s Order Against Cement Companies, available at: <http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.in/2012/06/summary-of-ccis-order-against-cement.html>, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

[62]Ibid.

[63] Supra N. 61.

[64]Ibid.

[65]Id.

[66]Id.

[67]Id.

[68]Id.

[69]Id.

[70]Id.

[71]Supra N. 61.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Id.

[74]CCI vindicates BAI’s stand, Cartelization By Cement Manufacturers, available at:

<http://www.baionline.in/media/data/Cement%20Cartelisation%20&%20BAI.pdf>, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

[75]Supra N. 74.

[76]Ibid.

[77]Id.

[78]Id.

[79] Supra N. 74.

[80] Ibid.

[81] CUTS Int’l, Studies of Cartel Case Laws In Select Jurisdictions – Learnings from the Competition Commission Of India, Oct. 15, 2007, available at:

<http://www.cutsccier.org/CARTEL/pdf/Study_of_Cartel_Case_Laws_in_Select_Jurisdictions-Learnings_for_the_CCI.pdf >, accessed on: 05-02-2015.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Id.

[84] Id.

[85] Id.

[86] Id.

[87] Id.

[88] Id.

[89] Supra N. 81.

[90] Ibid.

[91]CCI, Study of Cartel Case Laws in Select Jurisdictions – Learnings for the Competition Commission of India, available at: <http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/completed/cartel_report1_20080812115152.pdf>, accessed on: 01-2-2015.

[92] S M Dugar, Commentary on MRTP Law, Competition Law and Consumer Protection Law, (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur), Vol. 1, Fourth Edition, 2006, at p.322.

[93] Supra N. 92

[94] Supra N. 91.

[95] Supra N. 91.

[96] Ibid.

[97]Id.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

[101] Nishith Desai Associates, Competition Law in India, Jurisprudential Trend And The Way Forward, available at: <http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research%20Papers/Competition%20Law%20in%20India.pdf >, accessed on 07-02-2015.

[102] Ibid.

4.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

· The Competition Act, 2002 : The Legal Text.

Secondary Sources

Ø John Black, Oxford Dictionary of Economics, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, Second Edition, 2002, at p. 368.

Ø S M Dugar, Commentary on MRTP Law, Competition Law and Consumer Protection Law, (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur), Vol. 1, Fourth Edition, 2006, at p.322.

Articles

§ Shroff Cyril, Kaur Uberoi Nisha, Cartel Enforcement in India: Standard and Burden of Proof, CPI Antitrust Chronicle February 2013 (1), available at: <http://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/india.pdf>, accessed on: 01-02-2015.

§ CCI, Competition Act 2002: Provisions Relating To Cartels, available at: <www.cci.gov.in/menu/cartels.pdf>, accessed on: 01-02-2015.

§ Nidhi Singh, Cement Cartelisation in India and Europe, available at:

< http://cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/NidhiInterns160311.pdf>, accessed on: 01-02-2015.

§ CCI, Study of Cartel Case Laws in Select Jurisdictions – Learnings for the Competition Commission of India, available at:

<http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/completed/cartel_report1_20080812115152.pdf>, accessed on: 01-2-2015.

§ Cyril Shroff & Nisha Kaur Uberoi Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A. Shroff & Co., Cartel Enforcement in India: Standard and Burden of Proof, CPI Antitrust Chronicle February 2013 (1), available at: < http://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/india.pdf>, accessed on : 01-02-2015.

§ CCI, Competition Act 2002: Provisions Relating To Cartels, available at:<www.cci.gov.in/menu/cartels.pdf>, accessed on: 01-02-2015.

§ NDTV, Corporates, What is Cement Cartelisation issue all about?, Oct. 16, 2013 07:59 (IST), available at:

<http://profit.ndtv.com/news/corporates/article-what-is-cement-cartelisation-issue-all-about-306552>, accessed on: 02-02-2015.

§ CCI vindicates BAI’s stand, Cartelization By Cement Manufacturers, available at:

<http://www.baionline.in/media/data/Cement%20Cartelisation%20&%20BAI.pdf>, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

§ Karan S. Chandiok, Summary of CCI’s Order Against Cement Companies, available at:<http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.in/2012/06/summary-of-ccis-order-against-cement.html>, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

§ CCI Order, Builders Association Of India vs Cement Manufacturers, 20 June, 2012, available at:

<http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/CaseNo29of2010MainOrder.pdf>, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

§ Prince Mathews Thomas, CCI The Cement Cartel Of India, (Forbes India; July 18, 2012) available at: <http://forbesindia.com/article/briefing/cci-the-cement-cartel-of-india/33354/1>, accessed on: 03-02-2015.

§ CUTS Int’l, Studies of Cartel Case Laws In Select Jurisdictions – Learnings from the Competition Commission Of India, Oct. 15, 2007, available at:

<http://www.cutsccier.org/CARTEL/pdf/Study_of_Cartel_Case_Laws_in_Select_Jurisdictions-Learnings_for_the_CCI.pdf >, accessed on: 05-02-2015.

§ Nishith Desai Associates, Competition Law in India, Jurisprudential Trend And The Way Forward, available at:

<http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research%20Papers/Competition%20Law%20in%20India.pdf >, accessed on 07-02-2015.

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